How do proficiency-based accountability systems affect inequality in academic achievement? This article reconciles mixed findings in the literature by demonstrating that three factors jointly determine accountability's impact. First, by analyzing student-level data from a large urban school district, we find that when educators face accountability pressure, they focus attention on students closest to proficiency. We refer to this practice as educational triage and show that the difficulty of the proficiency standard affects whether lower or higher performing students gain most on high-stakes tests used to evaluate schools. Less difficult proficiency standards decrease inequality in high-stakes achievement, while more difficult standards increase it. Second, we show that educators emphasize test-specific skills with students near proficiency, a practice we refer to as instructional triage. As a result, the effects of accountability pressure differ across high-and low-stakes tests; we find no effects on inequality in low-stakes reading and math tests of similar skills. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that instructional triage is most pronounced in the lowest performing schools. We conclude by discussing how these findings shape our understanding of accountability's effects on educational inequality.
Most educational accountability systems evaluate schools based on the percentage of students performing above a score deemed ''proficient.'' This focus on proficiency potentially influences how educators distribute instructional resources, as schools get no credit for raising the achievement of students already above or far below proficiency. Teachers thus have a short-term incentive to focus on ''bubble'' students, those close to the proficiency cut score, especially when increasing a small number of students' scores can improve the school's accountability rating. This practice, known as educational triage, may have important implications for educational stratification.
Although the short-term incentives created by proficiency-based accountability systems are clear, the literature on their differential impact on lower and higher performing students is decidedly mixed. In cases where the proficiency standard is high relative to students' achievement, schools may neglect students far below proficiency. As a result, students at the 50th percentile of the test score distribution may benefit, while those at the 10th percentile may not. Alternatively, where the proficiency standard is set low, schools may focus less attention on higher achieving students. In this case, students at the 10th percentile may improve, while those at the 90th percentile may not. Qualitative and survey studies have found that educators focus more attention on students close to proficiency when they face accountability pressure (Booher-Jennings 2005; Gillborn and Youdell 2000; WeitzWhite and Rosenbaum 2007) , sometimes to the detriment of the lowest performing students, but quantitative studies have come to a variety of conclusions about accountability's consequences on inequality in academic achievement.
In this article, we propose that these mixed results can be reconciled by understanding that three factors influence the effects of proficiencybased accountability systems on inequality in math and reading skills. The first is the percentage of the population that falls below the proficiency standard. That proficiency standards differ dramatically across states makes the difficulty of the cut score (i.e., the score above which students must score to be considered proficient) a prime suspect for producing variation across studies. If teachers do direct resources to students close to proficiency, we expect the lowest scoring students will benefit when proficiency standards are low and will fall behind when proficiency standards are high.
The second factor is the extent to which gains on high-stakes state tests used for accountability generalize to other assessments. A substantial literature demonstrates that schools focus on test-specific skills to increase high-stakes test scores (for an excellent summary, see Koretz 2008) . Paying more attention to content that predictably appears on high-stakes tests, or coaching students to respond to predictable question structures, may bolster scores without improving other measures of achievement. We call this practice instructional triage. As a result of instructional triage, studies using high-stakes measures may tell a different story about the effects of accountability on inequality than does research using other measures of achievement. This is important not only because it affects the inferences we make about accountability's effects on math and reading skills, but because high-stakes tests have multiple users. Students', teachers', schools', and parents' future educational decisions may be affected by high-stakes test scores, and policy makers may use these data to shape and legitimate future educational policies.
The third factor is the concentration of low-performing students in a school. We expect that in schools where the number of students in academic need exceeds the resources available to serve them, educators' focus on students near proficiency will be most acute. We also predict that high-stakes gains are least likely to generalize to other assessments in the lowest performing schools. Put differently, because low-performing schools often have limited organizational capacity to systemically improve instruction, we expect high-stakes gains to largely reflect instructional triage.
In what follows, we first review the literature on the consequences of accountability systems for lower and higher achieving students and the impact of accountability pressure on instruction. We propose that mixed findings on this issue emerge from differences in the outcomes and the contexts studied. We then describe our analytic strategy, which uses variation in two cohorts' exposure to the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) to identify its effects. We exploit differences in the difficulty of the reading and math proficiency standards relative to the achievement distribution to establish how this factor affects student performance. Unlike existing studies, we are able to evaluate how proficiency-based accountability systems affect two outcomes: state tests used for accountability (''high-stakes tests'') and a second measure of achievement in which the stakes are low for individual teachers and schools (hereafter, ''lowstakes tests'').
Our analysis addresses three questions:
Research Question 1: Are the effects of accountability systems on lower and higher performing students' academic achievement modified by the difficulty of performance standards? Research Question 2: Are the effects of accountability systems on lower and higher performing students' academic achievement similar on high-and low-stakes tests? Research Question 3: Do these effects vary across low-, mid-, and high-performing schools?
Consequences of Educational Accountability for Inequality in Academic Achievement
How is the achievement of students at different parts of the score distribution affected by proficiency-based accountability systems? A number of studies have considered the average effects of state accountability systems (Carnoy and Loeb 2002; Dee and Jacob 2011; Hanushek and Raymond 2004; Hout and Elliott 2011; Wong, Cook, and Steiner 2009) , but whether these systems consistently help lower, average, and high-performing students is less clear. We begin by reviewing the qualitative and survey literature on how educators respond to accountability systems. Ethnographic studies of educators' responses to accountability pressure in Texas, Chicago, and the United Kingdom all demonstrate that educators focus their attention on students close to passing when they are rewarded for moving students to proficiency, a process known as educational triage (Booher-Jennings 2005; Gillborn and Youdell 2000; Weitz-White and Rosenbaum 2007) . Survey evidence corroborates these findings. In the early period of NCLB implementation, a RAND three-state study found that 77 to 90 percent of elementary school principals reported encouraging teachers to ''focus their efforts on students close to meeting the standards'' and 29 to 37 percent of teachers reported doing so (Hamilton et al. 2007:85) . Reback, Rockoff, and Schwartz (2011) later merged these survey data with state test score data, allowing them to estimate the amount of accountability pressure schools faced. They found that in schools with low probabilities of failing NCLB's Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) requirement, 26 percent of teachers reported focusing on students close to proficiency. In schools more likely to fail AYP, 53 percent of teachers focused on these students. These data suggest that accountability pressure is associated with how teachers allocate instructional resources between students.
A variety of scholars claim to test the educational triage hypothesis, but no agreement exists about the meaning of this concept. Disagreement partly arises from one group of scholars defining the term based on student outcomes, whereas others rely on inputs. In the qualitative studies from which this concept originally derives, scholars described educational triage based on observed educator behavior and organizational strategies (inputs), and the term referred to educators allocating resources in ways that maximize proficiency rates. For other scholars analyzing administrative data sets, educational triage implies a system of distributing educational resources within schools that benefits students whose test scores are close to proficient while harming those at the top and bottom of the performance distribution.
We believe the operationalization that provides the most conceptual leverage uses the concept of educational triage to refer to schools and educators allocating resources to maximize proficiency rates. Consider two states in which all teachers adopt the same behavior of focusing resources on students closest to proficiency. In the first state, only 15 percent of all students are not proficient, so the lowest performing students in the state are the ''bubble students.'' In the second state, 85 percent of students are not proficient, so some of the state's highest performing students are bubble students. The definition we propose would call teachers' allocation process in both states educational triage; it is not dependent on the difficulty of the cut score relative to the achievement distribution of students in a state or in a school. Because our definition highlights both the allocation process and its outcomes, it can be used to describe behaviors observed in qualitative studies and can be detected in quantitative studies when we observe larger than expected gains near proficiency.
A large number of quantitative studies have studied the heterogeneous effects of accountability across the student performance distribution (see online Appendix Table 1 at soe.sagepub.com). Low-performing students appear to consistently benefit when the proficiency standard is low (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2009; Ladd and Lauen 2009; Reback 2008 ), but they lose ground when the proficiency standard is high or rising from low to high (Jacob 2005; Krieg 2008; Lauen and Gaddis 2012; Neal and Schanzenbach 2010) . In addition, differential effects of accountability for higher and lower achieving students appear more muted on low-stakes tests and inconsistent across grades and subjects (Dee and Jacob 2011; Reback et al. 2011; Springer 2008; Ballou and Springer 2011) .
Instructional Responses to Accountability Pressure
Teachers can also change how they allocate instructional time to different parts of the state standards, in addition to changing how they distribute resources among students. This can be an effective strategy for raising scores because tests are based on a sampling principle. Students are administered a sample of items from a knowledge domain of interest (e.g., eighth-grade mathematics), and a well-designed test allows one to make inferences from performance on this sample to the whole domain. When stakes are high, as they have been for schools, teachers, and sometimes students in recent years, educators have an incentive to narrow instruction to focus on predictable material on state tests (Koretz 2008 ). The result is often score inflation, which occurs when test scores overstate students' skills in the tested area and do not allow for valid inferences of students' skills in the larger domain.
Studies of standard coverage show that state tests do not sample the full state standards and are predictable in ways that facilitate test-specific instruction. Jennings and Bearak (2010) found that teachers respond to predictable test features by focusing on frequently assessed standards-that is, ''teaching to the test''-and this response is stronger in schools facing greater accountability pressure. Survey evidence largely confirms these findings. In the RAND study of NCLB implementation in three states, teachers reported that they identified ''highly assessed standards'' on which to focus their attention . Reback and colleagues' (2011) study of the same data found that in schools facing substantial accountability pressure (those below the AYP margin), 84 percent of teachers reported focusing on topics emphasized on the state test, compared to 69 percent of teachers in schools at low-risk of failing AYP.
A complementary group of studies on ''teaching to the format'' illustrates how the design of high-stakes tests may lead educators to focus on particular formats in their teaching that parallel those appearing on high-stakes tests (Pedulla et al. 2003; Shepard and Dougherty 1991) . The most well-known example of this phenomenon comes from Shepard's (1988) finding that students could effectively add and subtract decimals when they were presented in a vertical format, but students struggled when decimals were presented in a horizontal format. While most ''teaching to the format'' studies predate the NCLB era, Reback and colleagues (2011:33) found that teachers in schools with higher accountability pressure reported looking for ''particular styles and formats of problems in the state test and emphasize [d] those in [their] instruction.'' In schools below the AYP margin, 100 percent of teachers reported following this strategy, compared to 67 percent of teachers at schools with a lower risk of failing AYP.
Taken together, these studies suggest that predictable assessments create incentives for teachers to engage in instructional triage; that is, to focus on predictably assessed content and present questions as they will appear on state tests. We believe this concept is a useful companion to educational triage, which describes which students are the focus of attention. Instructional triage instead describes what content and presentation of material receives more attention. To the extent that students learn how to correctly answer questions when they are presented in a specific format but struggle with the same skills presented in a different format, instructional triage can create gains on high-stakes tests while leaving students' underlying skills largely unchanged.
In summary, although the literature on the effects of accountability on lower and higher performing students is mixed, we attribute these inconsistencies, in large part, to differences in proficiency standards across states and differences in the stakes associated with the outcome measured. Our study is the first to bring together these two issues and isolate the relevance of proficiency standard difficulty for inequality in academic achievement on both high-and low-stakes tests.
Data and Methods
We analyze longitudinal student-level data from the Houston Independent School District (HISD) from 2001 through 2004, the period during which NCLB was first implemented. HISD is the seventh largest school district in the country and the largest in the state of Texas. Among third-through eighth-grade students, 53 percent are Hispanic, 32 percent are African American, 10 percent are white, and 3 percent are Asian. Close to 80 percent of students are considered by the state to be economically disadvantaged, 27 percent have a Limited English Proficient classification, and 11 percent have a special education classification.
A unique feature of these data is the availability of high-and low-stakes test scores for each student over the period before and after assignment of the first Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) ratings under the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). When we describe ''stakes'' in this article, we are referring to the stakes for teachers and administrators, not the stakes for students. The Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS), the district's high-stakes test, is administered to students in grades 3 to 11 in reading/English language arts, mathematics, writing, science, and social studies, although reading and math are the only subjects tested every year between grades 3 and 8. The Stanford Achievement Test is administered to all students in grades 1 to 11 in reading, math, language, science, and social science. HISD added the Stanford Achievement Test under pressure from a business task force that sought a nationally normed benchmark test (McAdams 2000) , and all students, except those with the most severe disabilities, are now required to take the Stanford. Both the TAKS and the Stanford have flexible time limits. During our study period, both tests were administered in the spring, from early March (Stanford) to mid to late April (TAKS).
The TAKS represents the district's high-stakes test for several reasons. First, TAKS test scores are used to assess schools' success in meeting AYP under NCLB. Second, proficiency rates on these tests have been an integral part of Texas's accountability system since 1994 (Reback 2008) . Under this system-which served as the model for NCLB-schools and districts are labeled ''exemplary,'' ''recognized,'' ''acceptable,'' or ''low-performing'' based on their proficiency rates in each subject area. In most years, monetary rewards were available for high-performing or improving schools, and low performers were subject to sanctions, including school closure or reconstitution. Third, HISD operated a performance pay plan during this period that provided monetary rewards to schools and teachers for exemplary TAKS results.
The Stanford can be considered HISD's lower stakes test, in that it is not tied to the state accountability system or teachers' performance pay during this period. However, this test plays several important roles in the district and is not a no-stakes test for students. For example, it is used as one criterion for grade promotion in grades 1 through 8. HISD students are expected to perform above a minimum standard on the Stanford (i.e., one grade level below average or above) as well as the TAKS. In addition, the Stanford is used in decisions to place students in gifted and talented programs and special education. For our purposes, it is ideal that students have good reason to exert effort on both tests, but the significance of the tests for teachers and administrators varies.
The TAKS and Stanford tests are intended to test similar grade-level domains, but they are not identical. Because the Stanford is a proprietary test, we were not able to examine items directly to compare them with the TAKS items.
1 Both test contractors, however, report that their tests are aligned with National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) frameworks. We have been able to identify only one analysis (Hoey, Campbell, and Perlman 2001) that maps the standards on the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) math test (in grade 4 only) to those covered on the Stanford; the analysis found considerable overlap, with 83 percent of the Texas standards represented on the Stanford. (The Stanford was a bit more inclusive, with 74 percent of Stanford standards represented on the TAAS.)
Given our focus, our study requires that students take the English version of both the Stanford and TAKS so they can be located in one test score distribution. This requirement complicates the study of grades 1 through 5 because the Stanford and TAKS administer Spanish-language versions in these grades. Approximately a third of students in grade 3 took the Spanish-language version of these tests. The proportion of students decreases to 20 percent in fourth grade and to 6 percent in fifth grade. By sixth grade, less than 1 percent of students take the Spanish versions. For this reason, we study student performance from sixth to eighth grade, where the vast majority of students are taking the same English-language version of the Stanford and TAKS. We do not include the small number of students taking the Spanish-language version in our sample.
We estimate the effects of NCLB on high-and low-stakes tests for students at different parts of the performance distribution. Prior research has used two main approaches to estimate accountability's impact on student outcomes. The first approach has attempted to establish the total effect of having a stronger accountability system in place across all schools, where the counterfactual is either no accountability system or a weaker accountability system. The second approach answers a fundamentally different question. That is, given that an accountability system is already in place, how does facing heightened school accountability pressure within that system affect student outcomes? In these studies, schools facing less or no accountability pressure serve as the counterfactual for students in high-pressure schools. Our study is in the former tradition and attempts to identify the effect of having NCLB in place relative to a world in which NCLB did not exist. We note, however, that because Texas implemented educational accountability in the 1990s, the pre-NCLB period already represents an era of heightened accountability, so the contrast we provide is not with a ''no accountability'' world.
Our strategy for identifying the effects of NCLB follows previous work by Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) . We rely on a cohort design and study two cohorts that took the same high-and low-stakes tests in grades 6 and 8. Schools attended by the 2001 sixth-grade cohort were not yet rated under NCLB between sixth and eighth grade. However, the 2002 cohort entered sixth grade before the first AYP ratings were assigned to schools and completed eighth grade in the year after these ratings were assigned. In short, the difference between these cohorts is that the 2002 cohort was treated for one year after AYP ratings were first released, whereas the 2001 cohort was not. (See Appendix Figure 2 for a figure outlining this strategy.) Both cohorts took all sixth-grade tests under a pre-NCLB regime, which is crucial to the analytic strategy we use here.
We first assign students in the 2001 sixth-grade cohort to quintiles based on their sixth-grade highstakes test scores and assign the 2002 sixth-grade cohort to these quintiles based on their 2001 distribution. Using test scores from the untreated 2001 cohort, we regress the eighth-grade high-stakes score on the sixth-grade low-stakes score for each quintile in five separate regressions. These models also include students' gender, race, and free and reduced-price lunch status. We then estimate five additional regressions where the outcome is instead the eighth-grade low-stakes score, but the predictor remains the sixth-grade lowstakes score, and the controls remain the same. We apply these respective prediction equations to the 2002 cohort to estimate their eighth-grade test scores on high-and low-stakes tests, which provides an estimate of how students in each quintile would have performed had NCLB not taken effect. We then compare the predicted eighthgrade high-and low-stakes scores with the observed eighth-grade scores of the 2002 cohort and infer that the difference can be attributed to This approach is not without limitations. It requires us to assume that no other unobserved factors correlated with time produced this result (e.g., changes in the high-stakes test) and that these changes are not simply a function of cohort-to-cohort differences. While we believe this is the best available analytic strategy to estimate the impact of NCLB with these data, and we have done our best to rule out alternative explanations, we stop short of calling the estimated differences between the pre-and post-NCLB cohorts a causal effect.
To determine how school context affects the process we observe, we examine whether being enrolled in schools at different levels of the school performance distribution affects students' test performance after implementation of NCLB. We assign each school in our analysis to a performance tercile-low, mid, or high-based on their pre-NCLB (2001) eighth-grade high-stakes math proficiency rate. Math pass rates in the three terciles are 51, 67, and 83 percent, respectively. We use this assignment for both math and reading analyses because reading proficiency rates are consistently high and there is substantially less variation across schools. We then separately report the mean difference between predicted and observed scores for students attending schools in each tercile.
Our sample includes students enrolled in eighth grade two years after they enrolled in sixth grade who took high-and low-stakes tests in both grades in a given subject. Our math analysis sample includes 8,659 students in the pre-NCLB cohort and 8,870 students in the post-NCLB cohort; our reading analysis sample includes 8,632 students in the pre-NCLB cohort and 8,811 students in the post-NCLB cohort. Table 1 displays demographic characteristics of our two cohorts, and Table 2 illustrates the incentives that schools face to focus on different parts of the achievement distribution. Proficiency standards for math and reading are set at very different levels relative to the Houston distribution. Students in the pre-NCLB cohort are much less likely to pass the math exam (67 percent) than the reading exam (87 percent), so schools have incentives to focus on different parts of the distribution on the two tests. Table 2 reports that in the pre-NCLB cohort, only 11.2 percent of quintile 1 students passed the math test. This increases to 24.1 percent for quintile 2 students and 49.1 percent for quintile 3 students. The overwhelming majority of quintile 4 and 5 students are proficient in math. For the reading test, 47 percent of students in quintile 1 are proficient, 79 percent in quintile 2 are proficient, and almost all students in quintiles 3 through 5 score at proficient.
RESULTS
These facts lead to two general predictions. First, we expect teachers to focus efforts toward the middle of the distribution in math and the lower part of the distribution in reading. Second, we expect schools will put more emphasis on the math test rather than the reading test because it is generally the math test that puts them at risk of failing to make Adequate Yearly Progress.
We now turn to our main results, which provide our estimates of how implementation of NCLB affected eighth-grade high-and low-stakes scores of students with different initial levels of achievement. Figure 1 provides kernel densities of the predicted and observed outcomes for the post-NCLB cohort's high-stakes test scores. The left panel shows that the lowest performing students in the post-NCLB cohort performed worse than predicted on the eighth-grade high-stakes test in math, which is what we would expect if resources were reallocated from the bottom of the distribution toward the middle and higher. In the right panel, observed scores for the lowest performing students shift to the right relative to their predicted reading scores. This is also what we would expect to see if schools allocated resources to the lowest performing students in reading. In summary, the difference between the observed and predicted distributions plotted in Figure 1 provides descriptive evidence that inequality between lower and higher performing students in math grew while it declined marginally in reading. Table 3 reports the mean difference between observed and predicted outcomes in each quintile for math and reading tests. Our estimates are consistent with teachers focusing on students closer to the cut score for proficiency, with some important exceptions that we discuss in the following. Students in the bottom quintile scored lower than predicted on their eighth-grade high-stakes math test, while students in quintiles 3, 4, and 5 performed higher than they would have had they not been exposed to NCLB. These effects are not trivial in size. Students in the first quintile lost .11 standard deviations on the high-stakes test, and students in the top quintile gained .25 standard deviations.
However, we do not observe similar effects on the low-stakes math test, suggesting that the relatively better and worse performance of the post-NCLB cohort at different parts of the distribution may be a function of acquiring test-specific skills that do not generalize to the low-stakes test. That is, results may be due to instructional triage. The post-NCLB cohort performed better than expected overall on their low-stakes eighth-grade Stanford tests, on the order of .064 to .099 standard deviations, but the positive effects are similar across quintiles. This result is more consistent with the interpretation that increased attention to mathematics equally benefitted students across the distribution. That is, if schools systematically reallocated time from reading to math for all students, because math proficiency rates were much lower, we might expect relatively even gains across quintiles.
Counter to our expectations, students in the fourth and fifth quintiles also experienced significant gains as a result of NCLB. While there is still considerable room for increasing proficiency in the fourth quintile-with 75.5 percent proficient in the pre-NCLB cohort-this is not the case for the fifth quintile (91.8 percent proficient). Why might we nonetheless observe gains in the upper quintiles? The most likely explanation, in our view, is that students in these quintiles are not sorted into separate classes. Especially in middle school, relatively higher achieving students might have math classes together, and interventions intended to help bubble students may spill over to higher achieving students. Moreover, teachers may not target quite as precisely as the educational triage hypothesis suggests, whether because they actively reject this approach or because they underpredict math proficiency for high-achieving students. We find substantially different effects on lower and higher performing students in reading, which we attribute to the lower difficulty of the reading proficiency standard. Lower quintile students performed better than expected on high-stakes reading tests, whereas upper quintile students performed worse than their predicted high-stakes scores. Students in the first quintile saw the most benefit from NCLB on their high-stakes tests, scoring .141 standard deviations above their mean predicted scores. They nonetheless experienced significant losses on their low-stakes tests. Unlike results for math, the post-NCLB cohort performed worse than predicted on their eighthgrade low-stakes reading test, with losses ranging from .203 to .372 standard deviations.
We believe part of the negative effect in reading, which is surprisingly large by education policy standards, is attributable to greater emphasis on math over reading more generally. The binding constraint faced by schools in their efforts to make NCLB AYP targets was clearly the math test, which could lead to a greater emphasis on math at the expense of reading. What effect, then, did these gains and losses have on changes in proficiency rates? Despite average losses in achievement gains for students in the first and second math quintiles, Table 2 shows that proficiency rates in those quintiles substantially increased relative to our predictions, with proficiency gains of 13.3 and 23.9 percentage points, respectively. This suggests that small gains for some students, which moved them over the proficiency cut score, were offset by larger losses for other students in those quintiles. (See Appendix Figure 1 for plots of the observed and predicted distributions relative to the cut score.) Table 2 also shows that the greatest gains in the reading proficiency rate were for the lowest performing students. Students in the first quintile of the reading distribution performed substantially better in the post-NCLB cohort in terms of proficiency (a 58.6 observed proficiency rate versus the predicted 33.9 percent proficiency rate). Table 4 decomposes these results by comparing students' actual eighth-grade math scores with their predicted scores by school performance level (low, mid, and high performing). Two major findings emerge from Table 4 . First, we observe the steepest gradient on the high-stakes test in the lowest performing schools. The difference between losses at the bottom quintile and gains at the top are .483 standard deviations, compared to .11 standard deviations in mid-performing schools. Because of the imprecision with which these effects are measured, we cannot conclude that the high-stakes distributional gradient varies across school types. However, students in the bottom third of schools did not display any gains on their low-stakes tests as a result of NCLB, whereas we do observe low-stakes gains in the middle and top school performance terciles. Moreover, if we consider the point estimates, low-stakes gains are generally greatest in the highest performing schools. While we are careful not to overinterpret these results given their imprecision, our results provide suggestive evidence that practices of instructional triage are most prevalent in the lowest performing schools, which almost half of the lowest performing students (those in the bottom quintile) attend (see Table 5 ). Table 6 shows the effect of NCLB on reading scores by school performance tercile. Unlike for math, we do not see evidence that schools facing more pressure responded differently. There are at Note: Schools were divided into three performance categories based on pre-NCLB proficiency rates. This table reports the difference between predicted and observed high-and low-stakes standardized eighth-grade scores of the post-NCLB cohort based on prediction equations generated for each quintile from the pre-NCLB cohort. Analysis sample includes students enrolled in eighth grade two years after they enrolled in sixth grade who took high-and lowstakes tests in both grades in a given subject. Pre-NCLB cohort ( The reading proficiency rate was already relatively high across the entire district, which means schools were under less pressure to raise proficiency rates through targeting high-return students and content. In addition, multiple studies demonstrate that math scores are more responsive to test-specific coaching than are reading scores. Similarities in the presentation of math problems on high-stakes tests enable these practices, whereas fewer test-specific coaching practices have been identified for reading. To summarize our results, proficiency standards for math and reading vary in their difficulty. The average student in the first two quintiles is expected to fail the eighth-grade math high-stakes tests, whereas the average student in quintiles 2 through 5 is expected to score at proficient on the reading high-stakes test. Our findings support the hypothesis that schools facing accountability pressure focus attention on students in the vicinity of the proficiency standard. We observe highstakes test benefits for students in math quintile 3 and above, and for reading, we observe these benefits in quintile 1. The difference between effects for high-and low-stakes tests is most pronounced in the lowest performing schools, which is suggestive evidence that school context plays an important role in shaping responses to accountability pressure. We attribute this finding to a process of instructional triage through which teachers impart test-specific skills to students near proficiency.
Discussion
This study demonstrated that the conclusions we draw about effects of accountability pressure on inequality in reading and math achievement are sensitive to the choice of outcome and are affected by the difficulty of the proficiency standard. Overall, our results show that accountability pressure increases inequality between low-and high-performing students on high-stakes math tests, decreases inequality on high-stakes reading tests, and has no effect on inequality in low-stakes This table reports the difference between predicted and observed high-and low-stakes standardized eighth-grade scores of the post-NCLB cohort based on prediction equations generated for each quintile from the pre-NCLB cohort. Analysis sample includes students enrolled in eighth grade two years after they enrolled in sixth grade who took high-and low-stakes tests in both grades in a given subject. Pre-NCLB cohort ( math and reading test performance. This is, to be sure, a complex set of results. Helping sociologists of education understand their implications requires that we broaden our lens to consider three mechanisms through which the effects of accountability pressure on test scores may exacerbate or attenuate educational inequality beyond their effects on test scores alone. We refer to these as skill consequences (which derive from the math and reading skills students gain or lose), signaling and labeling consequences (which occur because test scores serve as a signal that influences students', teachers', schools', and parents' future educational decisions), and policy feedback consequences (which result from policy makers' use of test results to shape future decisions).
Skill Consequences. The motivating question of this study was how proficiency-based accountability systems affect inequality in math and reading achievement. Our results demonstrate that the answer depends on which outcomes you care about. If we rely on our high-stakes outcome, we come to the conclusion that proficiency-based accountability systems increased inequality in math and decreased inequality in reading. In math, these increases were the result of losses for the lowest performing students and gains for higher performing students. For reading, they were the result of gains for lower performing students and losses for higher performing students. If we rely on our low-stakes results, we come to the conclusion that all students benefitted and lost equally on the math and reading tests, respectively. In other words, low-stakes tests have no effect on inequality, even as the level of overall performance increased for math and decreased for reading. Our results suggest that both sides of the debate on the inequality consequences of accountability systems have been, at least in some sense, correct. Educational triage-that is, focusing on students close to proficiency-appears to be a widespread response to proficiency-based accountability systems, and ''bubble'' students gain more on highstakes tests. In the past, scholars observing this behavior directly, and those who found particularly negative consequences for the lowest performing students, have decried this practice and argued that it may play a central role in reproducing inequality. This prediction, however, is partially dependent on these skill advantages transferring to other educational outcomes in both the short and longer term. We uncover the concomitant practice of instructional triage by evaluating the impact of proficiency-based accountability on a low-stakes test. Policy makers and educators who have argued that NCLB is not harming the lowest performing students' math and reading skills also have evidence to support their argument based on our results, although not for reasons they might have expected.
Our findings suggest that policy makers face a series of difficult normative questions when they decide where to set the cut score for proficiency. In contrast to a long history of failed reforms, our results provide suggestive evidence that education policy has direct effects on how resources are allocated within schools, although we cannot explicitly measure the instructional processes that produced these results. This also means that policy decisions about proficiency standard difficulty potentially affect school-level decisions about resource allocation, and thus inequality in math and reading skills. Although our results may represent short-term effects of accountability systems rather than their longer-run consequences, we cautiously conclude that more difficult proficiency standards are likely to increase skill inequality, whereas less difficult proficiency standards are likely to decrease it.
Even if the public could agree on whether we should privilege gains at the bottom of the distribution or gains at the top, the uneven distribution of higher and lower achieving students from different social backgrounds further complicates the question of policy design. Due to patterns of economic and racial segregation, high-achieving students from historically disadvantaged groups attend schools with higher fractions of low-achieving peers than do their high-achieving counterparts from historically advantaged groups. As a result, lower cut scores may hurt the highest achieving poor, black, and Hispanic students, even as lower cut scores would benefit these groups' performance on average. This concern appears to be borne out in multiple papers tracking the performance of high-achieving black students (Clotfelter et al. 2009; Hanushek and Rivkin 2009). Signaling and Labeling Consequences.
Test scores have multiple functions in schooling contexts that extend their effects beyond the measurement of cognitive skills. Because high-stakes test score data are utilized in many different ways by students, teachers, schools, and parents, the effects of accountability pressure on students' high-stakes test scores may be particularly important to understanding accountability's impact on educational inequality.
Unlike the low-stakes tests we examined, highstakes tests divide students into multiple levels of proficiency based on their scores. Students can be labeled as commended, meeting the standard, or not meeting the standard. Since the Pygmalion study found that providing randomly assigned performance labels to teachers can affect students' subsequent performance on standardized tests (Rosenthal and Jacobsen 1968) , it has been clear that performance labels can have significant educational consequences. Papay, Murnane, and Willett's (2011) study provided a powerful demonstration of this concept by showing that students earning an ''advanced'' label on Massachusetts's exit exam were more likely to attend college than those who scored just below this cut score. In this case, providing new information about student performance in the form of a performance label influences students' decisions to continue their formal education.
By shaping not only how students see themselves, but also how peers, parents, and teachers perceive students, high-stakes test scores plausibly affect academic identities, engagement in school, peer dynamics, teacher and parental expectations (and thus ability group and course placement [see Kelly and Carbonaro 2012] ), and future educational decisions. Considered from this angle, that the inequality effects we observe on high-stakes tests do not transfer to low-stakes tests is irrelevant because effects of accountability on high-stakes tests shape academic inequality through other mechanisms.
Policy Feedback Consequences. In addition to these micro-level mechanisms, the effects of accountability systems on inequality may result from how test score data shape policy makers' and the public's understanding of educational inequality. Measures themselves play a central role in constructing social problems. For example, poverty rates and unemployment rates are social metrics that affect how we understand effects of economic and social policy. Because poverty and unemployment measures have important implications for the policies we adopt and for the success or failure we ascribe to our public officials, how they are measured is constantly contested. Multiple versions of these measures exist, and policy makers and researchers advocate fiercely for the use of one measure versus another precisely because they are so important to framing policy debates (and thus the allocation of scarce resources). Similarly, the portrait of schools' performance and educational inequality provided by high-stakes test score data matters because it shapes the actions taken to address these inequalities in the future.
From the ''policy feedback loop'' perspective, the implications of our results are less clear. High-stakes scores typically receive the most attention in the news media and are used by policymakers as official measures of educational progress. We suggest that at least two different narratives about educational inequality and the role of schools in addressing it can arise from apparent increases in proficiency rates and declines in the size of proficiency-based achievement gaps. The first narrative is a ''beating the odds'' narrative. The fact that test scores tell a story of decreasing gaps may spur and legitimate investment in disadvantaged children, given that such gaps have been difficult to close historically. The second narrative is a ''mission accomplished'' narrative. From this perspective, our current policies have been successful at reducing inequality, and we need not look for or invest in new education or social policy solutions. Both narratives have powerful proponents, and the way actors deploy existing test score data can lend support to either perspective.
Low-stakes test scores, however, also play a role in constructing a counternarrative about the gains produced by accountability systems. When former Houston Superintendent Rod Paige was appointed Secretary of Education, the New York Times analyzed low-stakes test data from Houston to argue that his accomplishments were inflated (Schemo and Fessenden 2003) . And when Arne Duncan was appointed Secretary, opponents pointed to low scores on another low-stakes test, the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), as evidence of his failure in spite of large gains on high-stakes tests (Anderson 2009 ). These examples illustrate how the deployment of test scores in policy debates has the potential to amplify their microlevel consequences.
Our study is not without limitations. While we were able to strategically use the different proficiency standards for math and reading to identify their impact, math and reading scores are not independent, although they are perhaps more so in a junior high school context than in a self-contained elementary classroom where one teacher is responsible for both subjects. The difficulty of the proficiency standard in one subject could certainly affect how resources are expended in another, and indeed we see evidence of this pattern in our data. If both proficiency standards were set equally high relative to the Houston distribution, we might observe more muted distributional effects for the math test. Moreover, our study's analytic strategy relies on observing NCLB in the early years of implementation because this allows us to generate the cleanest short-term estimate of its effects. Yet effects may vary over time as pressure becomes more intense. We suspect this would exacerbate, rather than attenuate, the differential effects on higher and lower performing students that we uncovered. On the other hand, over time, schools may develop new organizational procedures and instructional strategies that ''lift all boats'' or that disproportionately benefit students at the low end of the test score distribution. This study does not allow us to make inferences about the longer term impacts of accountability pressure on the distribution of achievement, and this remains an important area for future research. Finally, we note that we studied a disadvantaged urban school district, and patterns we observed in this district may not generalize to schools of higher socioeconomic status.
Whether our findings generalize to other contexts can be tested in the coming years, as states across the country implement the Common Core standards and the more rigorous assessments associated with them. In the two states that have implemented these assessments, Kentucky and New York, approximately 70 percent of students scored below proficient. Our findings predict that high proficiency standards have two consequences: they produce increases in average achievement and increase inequality in highstakes achievement between higher and lower performing students. While limited data availability makes it difficult for our predictions about lower stakes tests to be tested, we believe that continuing to track achievement on both types of tests is critical to developing a comprehensive understanding of the effects of accountability on levels of and inequality in academic achievement.
Appendix Figure 1a . Distribution of predicted and observed math eighth-grade high-stakes scores for the post-NCLB cohort. NCLB = No Child Left Behind.
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